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Telepresence and Tele-absence: A 
Phenomenology of the (In)visible Alien Online 
 
“The problem, actually, does not lie in telepresence, 
which amplifies our own possibilities to the level 
where distance is abolished; but in tele-absence, 
which withdraws from its own access.” 
(Waldenfels, 2009, p. 110) 
 
Norm Friesen, Boise State University, Boise USA 




Proliferating media forms, from tablets to Twitter, are changing communicative practice, 
delimiting new experiential horizons, and thus providing phenomenological research with novel 
variations on the experience of self and other. Videoconferencing via Skype or FaceTime offers 
prominent examples of these changing forms. Despite the use of these communication 
technologies in both educational contexts and everyday life, educational videoconferencing has 
been described in the research literature as “a hidden mode of delivery, employing invisible 
pedagogical techniques.”  In this study I address this situation of simultaneous familiarity, 
invisibility and uncertainty by focusing particularly on the lived experience of space, the body and 
eye contact in videoconferencing contexts. This study suggests that the disruption of spatial 
coherence and power of gaze and mutual gaze are all but unavoidable features of this experience. It 
concludes by emphasizing the importance forms or expressions of absence, such as the diminution 





Tablets and smart phones, together with new communication services such as Skype and Twitter, 
have changed what it means “keep in touch.” These proliferating forms are delimiting new 
experiential horizons, providing phenomenological research with novel variations on the 
experience of self and other. The experiential study of such communication is of particular 
importance in the fields of distance education and educational technology, disciplines which both 
investigate and utilize these technologies for teaching and learning. In courses and degree 
programs in these fields, digital media are increasingly the only means of contact between teacher 
and student, and between students themselves. Among these technologies, audio/video or 
videoconference communication is widely favored, at least in theory: “Media richness theory,” as 
one example, “proposes that media differ in the ability to facilitate changes in understanding 
among communicators, [with] face-to-face communication [being] richer… than written memos 
because it enables immediate feedback and …cues such as facial expressions” (Kahai & Cooper, 
2003, p. 264). The immediacy and cueing may be vital for remote students seeking advice from 
their teachers about their grades or their future, or for an advisor wishing to express related support 
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or concern. Indeed, Microsoft’s Skype, Apple’s FaceTime or Google’s Hangouts boast that their 
users can be “in two places at once,” that “conversations” can be brought “to life” or that distant 
interlocutors can communicate literally “face-to-face.” Freedom and immediacy are reconciled and 
conjoined. However, at the same time, research on video conferencing frequently brings attention 
to its multiple communicative challenges and educational pitfalls. Jaron Lanier, an expert on 
virtual realities, admits that “videoconferencing seems precisely configured to confound … 
nonverbal elements [of] human interaction” (2001, p. 68). Since Lanier made this observation, 
videoconferencing has certainly changed in its availability, but not in its fundamental 
configuration. 
What is the significance of these contradictory claims and realities for education? Do popular 
audio/visual technologies actually enable student-teacher communication that is “as good as” face-
to-face? If something might be missing or “confounded” in these interactions, what might it be, 
how would it be experienced and how could it be addressed? Are there demands made on these 
technologies that are particular to education? In this paper, I respond to these questions by using 
hermeneutic phenomenology, the study of lived experience and its meanings, to examine and 
interpret incidents experienced by teachers and moderators using online conferencing technologies.  
 
The Videoconference: A well-known but hidden mode of delivery 
 
Given the recent and rapid rise of popular video-conferencing systems such as FaceTime and 
Skype,i the quantity of educational literature reporting on the effective use of audio-visual 
telecommunication is surprisingly small. The “body of literature on the use of videoconferencing 
in schools” as one recent review states, is “limited” (Lawson et al., p. 316). Another highlights “a 
lack of practical and field-proven models” specifically for video communication in inquiry-based 
learning –a finding which likely also applies more broadly. Also, over time, the practical findings 
and recommendations provided in the literature have changed. For example, Diane Laurillard 
prominently characterized videoconferencing in her 1993 Rethinking University Teaching as a 
“one-to-many medium, making it a sensible way to provide access for many sites to a remote 
academic expert” (Laurillard, p. 166). Accordingly, Lawson and Comber explain, “the use of 
videoconferencing in higher education institutions” initially “focused on the concept of the remote 
lecture” (2010, p. 296). Through further research and practice, however, researchers and 
practitioners have gradually come to see this medium as suited to interactive use rather than to 
“one-to-many” broadcasts. One 2004 review recommended that “educators should use the ‘15 
minute rule,’ limiting presentations or talking heads to no more than 15 minutes” (Greenberg, 
2004, p. 17); by 2010, it is not uncommon to find studies pointing to “interaction …as the key 
component of a constructivist use of videoconferencing” (Lawson et al., 2010, p. 306). However, 
the question remains as to how this interaction is to be realized: Interaction “in the 
videoconferencing medium is not without its challenges,” Gilles (2008) admits –adding that while 
interaction is widely seen “as the key to successful videoconferencing,” students engaged in such 
interaction have “reservations about its effective use” in actuality (pp. 110, 114).  
Overall and perhaps counterintuitively, this most advanced of communication technologies 
seems to position the teacher in his or her most traditional role, as “a sage on the stage,” rather than 
as a facilitator or “guide on the side” (see: King, 1993). “The learning environments that were 
observed… were typically teacher-centered and strongly teacher-directed,” one early (1997) study 
reports, noting that “few teachers used instructional models that would enable them to promote 
higher-order learning outcomes” (Oliver & McLaughlin, 1997, p. 51). Evidence showing that this 
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pattern continues in later use and analysis is readily available. The 2008 student survey mentioned 
above, for example, found that students valued the “videoconference… most for the opportunities 
for tutor–student interaction” (Gillies, 2008, p. 115). The emphasis, evidently, was not on 
interaction among students but between any single student and the tutor or instructional personnel. 
Indeed, the videoconference not only seems to affirm the traditional responsibilities of the teacher-
as-sage, but actually adds to these. Besides being a lecturer and interlocutor, the teacher is often 
also asked be a coordinator or orchestrator –in discussion moderation (e.g., Latta & Thompson, 
2011, p. 14) or in the facilitation of appearances by remote guests and experts. Reporting 
specifically on the latter in the context of fine arts classes, Barniskis and Thompson (2012) 
explain: 
 
This approach underscores the important role of the teacher in the room with the students, 
who has to function as the eyes and ears of the [guest] artist and who also can facilitate the 
learning in a hands on way that augments or clarifies what [the guest] is communicating. 
(p. 20) 
 
This apparent contradiction between the teacher-centered realities and the interactive potential of 
videoconferencing is paralleled by the broader tension between its everyday familiarity and the 
simultaneous paucity of relevant research. As Lawson and his co-authors conclude, “the field of 
videoconferencing in education is… under-researched by the academic community. In many 
senses,” they continue, “it remains a hidden mode of delivery, employing invisible pedagogical 
techniques” (2010, p. 307). Or as Tomlinson et al. conclude, “Videoconferencing is not new, 
having been used in business contexts for a number of years, but ‘best practice’ models for its use 
in education are still developing” (Falloon 2012, p. 2). 
 
Phenomenology: Bringing the Hidden to View 
 
In this study I address this situation of simultaneous ubiquity, invisibility and uncertainty by using 
phenomenological hermeneutics, a method which –despite its sometimes cumbersome 
nomenclature– strives to bring to attention to everyday and sometimes banal and overlooked 
aspects of experience. Simply put, hermeneutics is the study of “the theory and method of 
interpretation” (Curtis, 2004, p. 222); and phenomenology, the study of lived experience (Kenkle, 
2008, p. 223). Taken together, these methodological components allow the researcher to focus on 
the lived meaning of an experience, with its meaning being the result of hermeneutic 
interpretation, and “phenomena” being the element or elements of the experience of 
phenomenological concern. With its focus on the unabstracted or concrete, phenomenology 
isolates and investigates lived experience in terms of the dimensions or “existentials” that are 
generally present in everyday experience: time, space, relation and the body.  
Thus, in the case of the videoconference, “time” is manifest in the duration of the conference 
itself, and also in moment-by-moment hesitations and interruptions, whether these are part of the 
technical or the social dynamics of the communication. Space involves the surroundings of those 
connected via videoconference, and can be defined in terms of visual space and setting (e.g., 
lighting, staging), audible space (e.g., vocal characteristics, background noise), the participants’ 
literal location (at home, at work, etc.) and the positions of screens, cameras and related elements. 
Since it takes place between persons, videoconferencing obviously involves relation. If there is a 
group or a class at one of these end-points, the relations among these participants also come into 
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play –and will often be compared with relations to those who are remote. The body, finally, has to 
do with how each presents their person in the videoconference, including how they are dressed, 
positioned and made (in)visible. Significantly, the body (the eyes, face and hands) is also the main 
source of the “non-verbal cues” that are so often highlighted as advantageous for communication 
via videoconference. As this paper later shows, the body also hides particular characteristics that 
are important for both the apparent strengths and the evident challenges of videoconferencing as an 
educational medium. 
Besides unfolding in space and time, and being oriented to or around the body and relation, 
experience is also structured by “intentionality.” This is not so much our explicit aims and goals, 
but rather the way that our awareness and consciousness is directed purposefully in and to the 
world around us. Thus, in a one-to-one videoconference, a participant’s attention initially might be 
directed at the other on the screen, to communication and relation with him or her. Later, this 
might shift to wording in a paper, or to include discussion of other shared concerns. Particular 
combinations or intersections of these elements can come to represent “themes;” for example, the 
“theme” of “flow” and its interruption in engagement with media (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) –and 
the corresponding continuity or interruption of intention in the videoconference experience. All of 
these experiential elements are studied by phenomenology not in technical or material terms, but as 
they are perceived or experienced. Thus if someone feels like a student is looking away 
distractedly, or that the teacher’s voice is echoing as if she’s in a cave, these impressions and 
characterizations are taken seriously and studied carefully as such. These experiences are not 
simply “explained away” as the result of sonic feedback or camera positioning (although these 
factors are certainly acknowledged).  
The qualitative, experiential data in the study reported here have been gathered through a 
number of techniques, including “hermeneutic interviews,” in which instructors who have used 
videoconferencing are asked to recall and describe specific incidents with students in 
videoconferencing settings, and to compare these experiences with possible face-to-face parallels. 
This paper also uses sources that are otherwise reflective of particular experiences, such as 
incidents described directly or indirectly in peer reviewed literature, as well as situations depicted 
in more vernacular sources, such as feature films and video clips. All of these are sources of 
possible human experience whose inclusion is intended to appeal to readers on the intersubjective 
level of shared experience, to be “recognizable” rather than objectively measured or statistically 
validated. One example of each type of evidence –a vernacular video, an incident in invoked in the 
“formal” literature, as well as one gleaned from a hermeneutic interview—are utilized in this 
paper.ii  
The data used to study this intentionally structured experience of space, time, body and 
relation are presented in the form of short textual descriptions. A hermeneutic explication typically 
follows on such a description. This hermeneutic discussion or reflection allows for the explication 
of the description in terms of time, space, time, body and relation, and for reference to 
phenomenological writings, including those of an explicitly philosophical nature. In particular, 
philosophical texts from phenomenologists Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Waldenfels, who have 




Phenomenology & Practice  21 
 
“Oh, and one more thi….” 
 
This study begins with an examination of a YouTube video recently made popular in social media. 
As I have been planning and working on this paper, I have seen (and shared) an amusing “viral” 
video titled “A Conference Call in Real Life” (Crosby & Stanton, 2014). In this case “real life” 
refers to the fact that the participants in the call are depicted as physically present in a typical 
conference room; however, all the other conditions of a conference call still hold. This type of 
conference is actually not a full videoconference; the participants are linked only by sound. In this 
sense, the video can be said to highlight intentionality, relation and space as they are mediated 
aurally, in isolation from visual perception. However, characteristics of this aural experience are 
recognizable in videoconferencing as well. (This “isolation” of aspects of an experience can be 
seen as illustrative of what Husserl and others after him have called “eidetic variation” in which 
specifically experiential “facets” are illuminated by being isolated and examined in turn.iii) At the 
beginning of the meeting, each participant’s arrival in the conference “room” is noted by the  
system repeating their name, and explicitly announcing their presence: “‘John’ has joined the 
conference.” Particularly in their subsequent contributions to the meeting, each participant brings 
with him or her the characteristics of a separate auditory environment. These include an unnatural 
echo, staccato or extended silences, or background noises such as a barking dog or a cappuccino 
machine. So although each participant is depicted as present in a shared visual space, these sounds 
suddenly become a part of the room’s ambience when the participant speaks, and disappear just as 
suddenly when he or she falls silent.  
However, it is the conclusion of this conference call that is my principle focus here:   
 
As he puts his things away, the conference chair, Tripp, says: “Well thanks everyone, once 
again.” After only the briefest pause he continues “Oh, and one more thi….” But he cuts his 
words short as he realizes that everyone has abruptly left. The room is now silent and empty. 
 
This incident can be interpreted as illustrative of a phenomenon that might be called 
communicative “availability.” One’s openness for communication tends to be managed or signaled 
in highly controlled ways through digital media or technology: You pick up the ringing phone and 
say “hello?” You see a green highlight beside those who are logged in (with you) via Facebook or 
Gmail; or you hear “‘John’ has joined the conference” in a conference call. In each case, the 
possibility of communication with others tends towards a sharp “all or nothing” distinction. Others 
are either simply “there” or they are not. Participants are suddenly available, and just as suddenly, 
without transition, become unavailable –when it is too late for them to be reminded of “one more 
thing.”  
Why would the chair’s (Tripp’s) final moment of frustration be so implausible in a “real” 
face-to-face meeting? What is otherwise involved in the transition between presence and absence 
at a meeting like this? Unlike video or audio conferences, a face-to-face meeting of course requires 
people to actually make their way to a physical destination. This takes place as passage through 
hallways, doorways, via elevators and stairways –if not through many other pathways, 
conveyances and conduits. These spaces would also include, in the example above, the perimeter 
of the meeting room and the paths (however short) to the points of entrance and exit. Indeed, we 
are constantly reminded that the location independence of videoconferencing frees us from passage 
through any space at all. It is easy to think of these places and spaces as simply ways of getting 
somewhere. However, these locations can be much more than that. They are spaces of habitual 
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traversal through which participants physically –and also likely mentally and socially– “converge” 
on their eventual purpose. After a meeting, a similar “divergence” takes place, starting from the 
periphery of the conferencing room, extending to the participants’ “homes” or other destinations. 
Unlike a formal meeting–with an agenda, minutes and motions– hallways, doorways and elevators 
can be places for informal communication, as this convergence and divergence takes place. The 
hallway, doorway and elevator are all “transitional spaces” where favors may be asked or granted, 
important reminders given and received, and where other exchanges may take place which are 
literally “off the record.”  
Such interaction, in other words, is not predetermined by an explicit agenda. There are even 
genres of communication that suggest the type of communication that can take place in such 
spaces: The “elevator pitch,” for example, refers to brief proposals made to (fortuitously 
encountered) customers or superiors; “water cooler chatter” –occurring neither at one’s desk nor in 
a conference room– is seen as important for team-building, motivation and mutual understanding. 
Communications and management experts readily provide advice for each of these genres. It 
seems that it is a similar space of informal, transitional interaction that Tripp, the chair, is seeking 
to put to use.  
From an explicitly phenomenological perspective –the perspective of possible lived 
experiences– these transitional places and spaces are seen to offer a wide flexibility for 
communication and cooperation, as Edward Casey describes: 
 
[Such p]laces …foster experiences that appear purposeless at first glance. We enter here an 
architectural realm that might be called “transitional” … [with] such characteristics as freedom 
of movement (within certain definite limits) and plasticity of aim. Thus we discern the special 
character of indirection in built places, their nonstraightforward aspects and roundabout 
features [which] are much more commonly characteristic of built places than we might first 
imagine (2009,  pp. 121-122)  
 
The design of virtual conferencing spaces, on the other hand, tend not to have these 
nonstraightforward “transitional” or threshold spaces for indirection and improvisation. It is as if 
their design is based on the narrow formalized definition of a meeting as structured precisely by 
agendas, minutes, rules and orders: The meeting should begin with a review of minutes, and it ends 
precisely when adjourned by the chair. Participants’ arrival and leave-taking are purely incidental 
and instantaneous, however close or far away they may actually be located from one-another 
geographically.  
However, the transitional spaces of the hallway or elevator do not gain their improvisational, 
multipurpose quality all on their own. As I show in the next section, it is from the multifaceted 
nature of the body, in subtle combination with what is allowed in traversal and transition, that such 
qualities emerge. Embodiment, as I have argued elsewhere (specificallyin The Place of the 
Classroom and Space of the Screen, 2011) involves multiple, simultaneous and unavoidable 
nuances of expression of attention and commitment. One’s body is always articulating a 
disposition and attitude, including dispositions such as passivity and receptivity. Moreover, unlike 
virtual presences, the body cannot be in two places at once. Online technologies, including those of 
videoconferencing are different, as Friesen explains: 
 
By requiring users to log on, to click here versus there [or direct one’s attention to the camera 
or the screen]… Web technologies repeatedly foreground explicit action over inaction. In this 
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sense, online technologies simply cannot match the unavoidable force, nuance, and multiplicity 
of the body as an “expressive space”… [Online forms of “presence”] too often requires one to 
insist, for example, “I’m here for you,” while one’s actual, indivisible, indubitable embodied 
presence requires no such insistence. (2011, p. 158) 
 
In videoconferencing in particular, the body is not simply erased or transcended; instead, it is 
foregrounded in specific and sometimes quite unexpected ways, as I describe in the next section.   
  
“Your are on-screen, and probably larger than life-size” 
 
My consideration of the body begins with a second piece of evidence, an incidental warning from 
Barniskis and Thompson (2012), whose descriptions and advice highlight the intertwining of the 
four experiential dimensions (body, time, space and relation) in interesting ways: “Even if… you 
are not ‘on,’” the authors advise, “you are on-screen, and probably larger than life-size. If you 
surreptitiously pick your nose, chances are that everyone can see you doing it” (p. 19). Joking 
aside, this passage highlights the relation of “you,” the teacher, to your students, or to “everyone 
[who] can see you;” and in their eyes, you –or rather your face and body– are “on-screen, and 
probably larger than life-size.” This refers to an initial characteristic of video-conferencing: its 
distortions of space and of the body in this space, through camera positioning and other settings 
(e.g., panning, zooming). We may be accustomed to seeing such “distortions” presented in 
conventionalized ways on TV and in movies; however, we are much less used to being thus 
projected and distorted ourselves, perhaps particularly in the classroom context. In his 2001 article 
on videoconferencing referenced above, Lanier explains this phenomenon in general terms while at 
the same time bringing out important relational implications: “participants aren’t able to establish a 
sense of position relative to one another,” he explains, “and [they] therefore have no clear way to 
direct attention, approval or disapproval” (2001, p. 68). One might also add to Lanier’s description 
that participants also do not know about how attention, approval or disapproval is directed toward 
them. This is certainly, if unconventionally, suggested in the reference to “surreptitiously pick[ing] 
your nose.” The disquieting or comic overtones of this image point to an underlying experiential 
complexity: It simultaneously involves relation (being seen by others) and the body (and 
expectations and taboos surrounding it).  
In connection with these disquieting overtones, the passage from Barniskis and Thompson is 
illustrative of a “theme” involving body and relation that is relatively well-developed in the 
phenomenological literature. This is the experience of being observed and in a way, objectified in 
the eyes of another. One of the earliest and perhaps most powerful accounts of such observation is 
provided by Jean-Paul Sartre in his famous description of “the look” (from Being and Nothingness, 
1953). Sartre imagines himself in a hallway, a “transitional space,” bent or leaning, and looking 
through a keyhole into in an apartment –again, a surreptitious act. In this act, intention and 
awareness are focused on what can be seen and heard through the keyhole –being “drunk in” by 
what is observed “as ink is by a blotter” (p. 348). Sartre continues: “But all of a sudden I hear 
footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me!” (p. 349). A complete reversal of awareness and 
intentionality takes place. Instead of an intentional focus on what is on the other side of the 
keyhole, the protagonist’s awareness is now focused on himself and his body as seen by the other: 
“I see myself because somebody sees me,” Sartre says, “I am indeed that object which the Other is 
looking at and judging” (p. 349). The self, in a sense, is reduced to the embodied act (leaning and 
spying, or other “surreptitious” activity); and in the absence of other communication, is 
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momentarily objectified in this act. The self in this context is not as much another subjectivity as it 
is a violator of others’ reasonable expectations to privacy. As if picking up directly from Sartre’s 
description, Merleau-Ponty explains: 
 
The other transforms me into an object and denies me… This is what happens, for instance, 
when I fall under the gaze of a stranger. However, this takes place not so much in combination 
with other acts of communication, as in their absence… [My] objectification … by the other’s 
gaze is felt as unbearable only because it takes the place of possible communication. (2002, p. 
420) 
 
Of course, videoconferencing technology generally offers a number of “other acts of 
communication.” Indeed, through its multiple modalities, this technology can be seen to compel its 
users to these other communicative acts. Although its effect is perhaps heightened by the body 
being shown as larger than life or as otherwise distorted, the possible experience of objectifying 
vision is diffused in at least two ways: 1) through sound or speech, which was touched on above, 
and 2) mutual glance or eye contact to, a multilayered form of contact which this paper now turns.    
 
“Mutually Enfolding Glances” 
 
The experience of the gaze or glance in mutual eye-contact illustrates the importance of a further 
phenomenological theme or set of possibilities: The broader theme corresponding to this reciprocal 
contact is the corresponding mutuality, reversibility or reciprocity of embodied communication 
and contact in general. In most social settings, to be seen by another is also to see him or her. To 
hear another is also (at least to have the possibility) to be heard; to touch is also to be felt (as 
ritualized in the handshake). To be approached by another, who for example asks for the time –
perhaps glancing at one’s eyes and also at one’s wrist– normally has little that is unbearable or 
distressing about it, unlike the look in Sartre’s hallway. This perceptual openness, sharing and 
reciprocity is perhaps at its most intensive in mutual eye-contact, as Merleau-Ponty recognizes:   
 
I look at him. He sees that I look at him. I see that he sees it. He sees that I see that he sees it… 
Well, even though in principle reflections upon reflections go on to infinity, vision is such that 
the obscure results of two glances adjust to each other, and there are no longer two 
consciousnesses with their own teleology but two mutually enfolding glances. (1964, p. 17) 
 
In even the briefest moment of eye-contact, as one psychologist puts it, “the other is attending to 
your attention while you are attending to hers” (Stawarska, 2006, p. 19). In thus seeing and being 
seen (as seeing), as Merleau-Ponty suggests, a kind of perceptual alignment is achieved. This 
alignment extends to the awareness of both involved, and even to their intentional focus or aim 
(teleology). In everyday expression, to say something while looking another “in the eye” is to 
“really mean” what has been said, and to presume to have been heard and believed. At the same 
time, eye-contact has freighted and highly ambivalent social meanings: It can prompt the 
aggressive “who’re you looking at?”, or be accompanied by the affirmative “here’s looking at 
you,” or it can lie somewhere in-between: “s/he gave me the look,” a comment regarding a 
communicative act that can have any number of specific meanings. Again, in most social settings, 
we believe we can feel that the gaze of another upon us, as if it has an almost tactile force. 
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Corresponding to this significance, there is no shortage of quantitative evidence on the value of 
eye-contact in collaboration and instruction.  
For example, mutual gaze is associated with increased cognitive task performance (Dalzel-Job, 
Oberlander, & Smith, 2011), and Bailenson, Beal, and Blascovich (2002) emphasize the 
importance of mutually confirmed gaze in teaching: 
 
During instruction, gaze helps learning, in that college students had higher performance on a 
learning task when the instructor gazed at them than when the instructor did not. Furthermore, 
when students are able to return the gaze to the instructor, they participate more in the 
instruction than when they [cannot]. (p. 315) iv 
 
However, this type of reciprocal contact is broken or fractured in the videoconference. The 
necessarily different positions of the camera and screen in videoconferencing systems leads to a 
disruption of precisely this “mutually enfolding” potential of the gaze. Eye-contact of a kind can 
occur, but in such systems, it cannot be simultaneously reciprocal. You cannot truly look an 
interlocutor in the eye since seeing another’s eyes means looking at the screen. You can give the 
appearance of making eye-contact, but this actually requires looking away from the other, and into 
the camera, generally positioned above the screen. This problem was recognized and studied by 
Bell Labs in the design of the first “Picturephone” (Stokes, 1969). Beginning at this early stage and 
since, attempts have since been made to address this problem through sophisticated combinations 
of software and camera hardware, or teleprompter-like configurations of screen, camera and bi-
directional mirror(s). On the other hand, some software designs exacerbate the difficulty by 
placing the images of one’s interlocutors not at the top but at the bottom of the screen, often the 
furthest distance from the video camera. It is precisely this configuration that forms the basis for 
the final piece of experiential evidence to be examined in this paper. This brief description is 
derived from an interview of an instructor who regularly meets with multiple students over 
videoconference: 
 
When I’m videoconferencing with my class, I always want to multitask –to check my email, 
hiding the row of student faces at the bottom of the screen. But then I just feel guilty: they think 
I’m looking at them, at the top of the screen, when I’m actually doing something else entirely! 
(Lisa, interviewee)v 
 
Underlying this description is a singular experiential situation: One in which the instructor gives 
her students the impression that she is looking at them squarely in the eye precisely when she is 
not. This effect may be said to be curiously multiplied, because the instructor is not looking at a 
single student, but at multiple “pairs of eyes” all at the same time. On the face of it, this is not too 
different from a newscaster or politician broadcasting via a teleprompter. However, while the 
scripting, display and timing of a teleprompter imply a rather elaborate set up to achieve an 
intended effect, in the case of the instructor, such apparent eye-contact or its absence actually 
happens by accident. 
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Conclusion: Telepresence or Tele-absence? 
 
As this description suggests, eye contact is about much more than one body or “self” seeing 
another, and the other simply reciprocating. It is instead a multidimensional form of 
communication of its own, with multiple layers or moments of perceptivity and receptivity –as 
descriptions from phenomenology and psychology suggest. Something similar can be said for the 
appearance of one’s person of body in the videoconference, and for the “virtual” visual and 
acoustic space constituted by this medium: there is more to each of them than initially meets the 
eye (or ear). We expect of this virtual space more flexibility (or “nonstraightforwardness”) than 
what is suggested by the most basic components of a meeting. And we may be surprised by the 
way we feel (or do not feel) ourselves to be observed, and by the ways the body may signal various 
–and not always desirable– functions and meanings while in this context. Given the multifaceted 
nature of the examples and other evidence considered here, some immediate and pragmatic 
implications can be developed. Three of these implications –corresponding to the three principle 
pieces of evidence examined– can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. The description of the adjournment of the teleconference highlights the importance of 
transitional spaces. These spaces cannot, of course, be literally or fully reconstituted in 
mediated contexts, but their absence might be compensated for through the use of other 
communication forms that register communicative availability in various ways, including 
the asynchronicity of email and of text messages or Twitter. These last two forms, text and 
Twitter, may be particularly helpful, since they are closer to real-time communication than 
email, but otherwise more flexible and tolerant of communicative “gaps,” such as the pause 
between Tripp’s initial farewell and his subsequent announcement or reminder. 
2. The warning about being “always on and probably larger than life” underscores the 
objectification of one’s appearance in the unblinking eye of the camera and the 
simultaneous lack of awareness of this surveillance. The investigation of this situation 
points to the importance of the absence of “other acts of communication” (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002, p. 420) in connection with such objectification. This analysis suggests one possible 
solution, which would be to deliberately eliminate visual contact when other 
communicative acts are not taking place. This would involve not more and better 
technology, but a discrete attenuation of its intrusion and default operation. Voice and 
vision, in other words, should broadly coincide. In the words of Barniskis and Thompson 
(2012), this would mean making it easy or automatic to actually not be “on” when salient 
communication is occurring elsewhere. 
3. The third example highlights the value of expanding the range of “other acts of 
communication” in videoconferencing to include modes of mutual eye-contact. The 
experiential importance of this eye-contact, as well as the importance of its apparent and 
mistaken presence in the videoconference points to the value of actively facilitating such 
contact in videoconferencing. This further suggests that using devices in two-way 
communication that can overcome this difficulty (e.g., by using teleprompter-like 
arrangements of screen and bi-directional mirrors) may be worthwhile.vi It is important to 
note that such a device would have to be used by all participants equally in video 
communication, since its function is clearly mutual or reciprocal in nature. 
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To draw its philosophical or theoretical deliberations to their own conclusion, this paper briefly 
returns to the multiple reflexivity of sight and of the body overall, particularly as this reflexivity is 
understood by one of Merleau-Ponty’s most prominent students, Bernhard Waldenfels. Waldenfels 
builds on Merleau-Ponty’s explanations by saying that the body as a whole does not conform to 
any non-reflexive dualisms or bifurcations of subject/object or perceiver/perceived:  
 
our body does not fit into this dualistic scheme. On the one hand, our body is exactly both at 
once: seeing and seen, hearing and heard, touching and touched, moving and moved. This 
…characterizes the very being of our body, which refers to itself and at the same time evades 
itself. (2011, p. 49)  
 
Despite –or perhaps because of– its many reflexive senses and its multiple potentialities, forms and 
functions, the body in a sense escapes from and exceeds itself. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the 
experience of our body… reveals an ambiguous mode of existing…. It is always something other 
than what it is…” (1962, pp. 230-231).vii The experience of our own bodies, in other words, is 
ambiguous and protean, exceeding any momentary action, expression, perception or impression. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of these characteristics –as it is manifest in multimedia 
communication—is that we do not see ourselves as others see us, nor do we hear ourselves as we 
are heard:  
 
When I hear my voice on a tape or see my face in a video I get into a situation where 
proximity and distance are entangled, and where all direct reflection is diverted by a 
peculiar form of deflection. (Waldenfels 2011, p. 49) 
 
The tone of our words and the situation of our bodies in the world are never fully available to our 
own perception, awareness and control. Videoconferencing contexts only seem to heighten this 
tendency to excess and escape, as the incidents of the conference-call adjournment and of being 
“on-screen…larger than life” illustrate. The body manifests presence and absence, visibility and 
invisiblity in ways more complex than the initial expectations in these scenarios seem to allow. A 
similar but more complex and perhaps ambivalent tendency towards this effect is also illustrated 
by the discussion of eye-contact, discussed above. We feel ourselves to be observed, and often 
believe our own gaze to be felt by those upon whom it momentarily rests. Whether the focus is on 
the eyes, the face or on a person taking his leave, the expressive and receptive space of the body is 
alternatively concealed and exaggerated in ways of which we cannot be fully aware, particularly 
when mediated through technologies such as video-conferencing.   
Waldenfels characterizes that which thus escapes our awareness and control –or as he says that 
which “withdraws” from us– as ultimately being “alien” to us. By this he means that it cannot or 
does not fit into the “order” that constitutes our self-awareness, or our “sphere of ownness,” as he 
puts it. (See the review essay on Waldenfels in this issue, pp. 68-77, for more). As the findings of 
this paper have shown, this order of the self is one that is disrupted and distorted by technical 
mediation, as Waldenfels himself acknowledges: 
 
Technology, which has for a very long time –despite all the contemporary lamentations about 
alienation through technology– been regarded as an extension of the sphere of ownness, now 
proves more and more to be a source of alienation of its own kind. (2011, p. 6) 
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Videoconferencing in this sense is also not simply an extension of the self and its order into other, 
remote realms, but is its own source of disruption and distortion of self and body. It is a 
“multiplier” of the alien in this sense. Moreover, Waldenfels predicts that minimizing or 
eliminating this intensified experience of the alien will be impossible, although he predicts that this 
task of minimization will stand as the principal challenge for technologies of telepresence such as 
videoconferencing. His prediction opens with the quote provided at the outset of this paper: 
 
What would a medium capable of mediating the immediate look like? […] The problem, 
actually, does not lie in telepresence, which amplifies our own possibilities to the level where 
distance is abolished; but in tele-absence, which withdraws from its own access. The 
withdrawal of the alien, which is also entrenched in our perception, strikes me with more 
force than the resistance of the alien, which is something I can defend myself against. With 
the latter, it is only a question of possessing greater or lesser force. But this is not the case for 
withdrawal, which is like a shadow that cannot be grasped… All technical artifice runs up 
against an inner border: If the alien were there, it would not be what it is. Even a video 
camera, which can not only register our voice and breathing, but even the lifting of the eyelids 
or the creasing of the brow, would fail when it comes to the glance that is more than 
something that is seen [or recorded], or to the voice that is more than something that is heard 
[or taped] –because voice and glance disrupt, incite, interrupt. Here technical media run up 
against the limit of representability, without being able to represent this limit themselves … 
(2009, pp. 110-111) 
 
As a technology of telepresence, video does not allow us to be present to ourselves, for example, 
by seeing one’s own gaze or hearing one’s “real” voice. Instead, the means by which we are 
present and absent to ourselves and to others are both augmented and distorted, amplified and 
attenuated: One might hear oneself on the other end of the line as a faint echo in a Skype call, for 
example. However, this is neither what one’s remote interlocutors hear, nor how you hear yourself. 
A student might also withdraw his or her gaze in a moment of discomfort or reticence. However, 
without the ability to register the positive mutual contact of the gaze in the first place, a moment of 
withdrawal, as Waldenfels says, “would withdraw from its own access.” As a retreat of an alien 
aspect of another’s body, “it would not be what it is” when thus mediated. Deprived of its ability to 
disrupt, incite or interrupt, the glance –particularly in its withdrawal– is an example of something 
standing beyond the unrepresentable limit of representability common to all communication 
technologies.  
In this sense, Waldenfels responds to his own question by insisting that it ultimately can’t 
be answered: “What would a medium capable of mediating the immediate look like?” Such an 
ideal form of telepresence would be impossible, just as any full or immediate self-presence –e.g., 
seeing or hearing oneself as others do and also while others do– is also impossible. At best, the 
gaze and voices of participants in a videoconference are reflected and refracted as if in a 
rudimentary hall of mirrors and echo chamber, with their coincidence being at times as much 
unintentional or illusory as directly expressive or intentional. 
 
                                                            
i Skype alone has over 300 million subscribers. 
ii Although it is not used here, scenes from the 2009 feature film Up in the Air could also readily be employed in this 
study. It tells the story of a travelling businessman (played by George Clooney) who is grounded by the 
“virtualization” of his off-site meetings through videoconferencing. 
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iii Husserl (1970) explains this technique by referring to the use of the researcher’s imagination and the example of a 
physical table: “Let us make this clear to ourselves, and then fruitful for our method. Starting from this table-
perception as an example, we vary the perceptual object, table, with a completely free optionalness, yet in such a 
manner that we keep perception fixed as perception of something, no matter what. Perhaps we begin by fictively 
changing the shape or the color of the object quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. In other 
words: Abstaining from acceptance of its being, we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one 
among other quite "optional" pure possibilities - but possibilities that are possible perceptions. We, so to speak, shift 
the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if, which supplies us with "pure" 
possibilities, pure of everything that restricts to this fact or to any fact whatever” (pp. 70-71). Today, this exploration 
of actualities and non-actualities need not understood as pure, imagined possibility; but can be actively explored using 
different virtual technologies and modalities that isolate and combine sound, vision, color and structure. 
iv Elsewhere in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty is ambivalent about the results of mediation on such 
a convergence of attention and intention: “And if someone does communicate with someone else, if the interworld is 
not an inconceivable in-itself and must exist for both of us, then again communication breaks down, and each of us 
operates in his own private world like two players playing on two chessboards a hundred miles apart. But here the 
players can still make known their moves to each other by telephone or correspondence, which means that they are in 
fact participants in the same world.” (2002, p. 416) 
v The interviewee is identified with a pseudonym. 
vi One such device is the See Eye 2 Eye - webcam teleprompter & eye contact device; see: 
http://www.bodelin.com/se2e  
vii The full passage from Phenomenology of Perception which these characterizations are taken can be productively 
compared to Waldenfels’ remarks: “The experience of our own body, on the other hand, reveals to us an ambiguous 
mode of existing. If I try to think of it as a cluster of third person processes—‘sight’, ‘motility’, ‘sexuality’—I observe 
that these ‘functions’ cannot be interrelated, and related to the external world, by causal connections, they are all 
obscurely drawn together and mutually implied in a unique drama. Therefore the body is not an object. For the same 
reason, my awareness of it is not a thought, that is to say, I cannot take it to pieces and reform it to make a clear idea. 
Its unity is always implicit and vague. It is always something other than what it is, always sexuality and at the same 
time freedom, rooted in nature at the very moment when it is transformed by cultural influences, never hermetically 
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